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[Crim. No. 9319.

In Bank.

Nov. 5, 1965]

In re JOE STERLING et al. on Habeas Corpus.
[1] Rabeas Corpus-Grounds-Evidence.-Defendants who were
convicted in a municipal court of gambling could not, in the
absence of extraordinary circumstances, collaterally attack the
judgment against them on the ground that evidence was unconstitutionally obtained and that its introduction at their
trial denied them due process of law, despite the fact that,
though all remedies at trial and on appeal were exercised,
direct review terminated in the appellate department of the
superior court, where the search and seizure issue was fully
tried, and the state's trial and appellate procedure was fully
adequate to meet procedural requirements for adjudication
of federal constitutional rights and to provide a record adequate for federal habeas corpus review.

PROCEEDING in habeas corpus to secure release from
custody. Writ discharged and petitioners remanded to the
custody of the Los Angeles Municipal Court.
'Valter L. Gordon, Jr., for Petitioners.
A. L. Wirin, Fred Okrand and Laurence R. Sperber as
Amici Curiae on behalf of Petitioners.
Roger Arnebergh, City Attorney, Philip E. Grey, Assistant
City Attorney, William E. Doran, James H. Kline and William R. Yates, Deputy City Attorneys, for Respondent.
TRAYNOR, C. J.-Petitioners were convicted in the Los
Angeles Municipal Court of gambling in violation of section
330 of the Penal Code. The People's case was submitted
[lJ See Cal.Jur.2d, Habeas Corpus, § 34; Am.Jur., Habeas Corpus
(1st ed § 53).
McK. Dig. Reference: [1] Habeas Corpus, § 26.
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solely on the arrest reports, and it was stipulated that petitioners would adduce no evidence other than that tending to
show an illegal search and seizure. The search and seizure
issue was fully tried. The court ruled that there was no
illegality and found petitioners guilty as charged. The appellate department of the superior court affirmed the judgment,
denied· a rehearing, and refused to certify the case to the
District Court of Appeal. In the absence of certification or
a published opinion, no further appeal was authorized by the
California Rules of Court. (Rule 62(a).)
[1] In this habeas corpus proceeding, petitioners attack
the judgment collaterally on the ground that evidence was
unconstitutionally obtained and that its introduction at their
trial denied them due process of law. (Mapp v. Ohio (1961)
367 U.S. 643 [81 S.Ct. 1684, 6 L.Ed.2d 1081, 84 A.L.R.2d
933] .)
In In re Shipp (1965) 62 Ca1.2d 547 [43 Cal.Rptr. 3, 399
P.2d 571], and In re Lessard (1965) 62 Ca1.2d 497 [42 Cal.
Rptr. 583, 399 P.2d 39], this court adopted the rule urged
in the concurring opinion in In re Harris (1961) 56 Ca1.2d
879, 880 [16 Cal.Rptr. 889, 366 P.2d 305], that habeas corpus
is not available to challenge the use of evidence obtained by
an unconstitutional search and seizure. We held that the
availability of collateral attack to challenge violations of
constitutional rights must be considered in light of the relevance of the violation to the correct determination of petitioner's guilt, the purpose of the constitutional principle involved, and the effect that granting the remedy would have
on the administration of criminal justice. "If the violation
of a petitioner's constitutional rights by the use of illegally
seized evidence had any bearing on the issue of his guilt,
there should be no doubt that habeas corpus would be available. Unlike the denial of the right to counsel, the knowing
use of perjured testimony or suppression of evidence, the use
of an iuvoluntary confession, or as in this case, the denial
of an opportunity to present a defense, the use of illegally
seized evidence carries with it no risk of convicting an innocent person. The purpose of the exclusionary rule is not
to prevent the conviction of the innocent, but to deter unconstitutional methods of law enforcement. [Citations.] That
purpose is adequately served when a state provides an orderly
procedure for raising the question of illegally obtained evidence at or before trial and on appeal. The risk that the
deterrent effect of the rule will be compromised by an occa-
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sional erroneous decision refusing to apply it is far outweighed by the disruption of the orderly administration of
justice that would ensue if the issue could be relitigated over
and over again on collateral attack." (In re Harris, supra,
56 Ca1.2d at 883-884.)
Petitioners contend, however, that the decision of the United
States Supreme Court in Linkletter v. Walker (1965) 381
U.S. 618 [85 S.Ct.1731, 14 L.Ed.2d 601] (see also Henry v.
Mississippi (1965) 379 U.S. 443, 452-453 [85 8. Ct. 564, 13
L.Ed.2d 408]) has now established that habeas corpus is an
available remedy in the federal courts to challenge illegal
searches or seizures in cases arising after the decision in Mapp
v. Ohio, supra, 367 U.S. 643, and that we should therefore
afford them a cognate collateral remedy in the state court~
We fully recognize this state's obligation to afford every
defendant a full and fair opportunity to secure an adjudication of all claimed deprivations of his constitutional rights in
the securing of the evidence ()ffered against him at trial. We
believe, however, that in the absence of extraordinary circumstances, the time and place to secure such an adjudication is
at the trial and on appeal. Unless these direct remedies were
inadequate for reasons for which the defendant was not responsible (see In re Spencer (1965) ante, pp. 400, 406 [46
Cal.Rptr. 753, 406 P.2d 33]), we see no basis for affording
him an opportunity to relitigate an alleged violation of such
constitutional rights by collateral attack in the state courts.
California's trial and appellate procedure is fully adequate
to meet the procedural requirements recommended by the
United States Supreme Court for the adjudication of federal
constitutional rights and to provide a record adequate for
federal habeas corpus review. (See Townsend v. Sain (1963)
372 U.S. 293 [83 S.Ct. 745, 9 L.Ed.2d 770) ; Case v. Nebraska
(1965) 381 U.S. 336, 340 [85 S.Ct. 1486, 14 L.Ed.2d 422)
[concurring opinion by Brennan, J.).) The right to counsel
(Cal. Const., art. I, § 13; Pen. Code, § 686, subd. 2; Gideon v.
Wainwright (1963) 372 U.S. 335 [83 8.Ct. 792, 9 L.Ed.2d
799,93 .A..L.R.2d 733), the right to liberal pretrial discovery
(see cases collected in Jones v. Superior Court (1962) 58
Cal.2d 56, 58-60 [22 Cal.Uptr. 879, 372 P.2d 919, 96 A.L.R.2d
1213), the right to compel the prosecution to establish the
legality of a warrantless search or seizure merely by objecting to the introduction of the offered evidence (People v.
Bllrl.·e (1964) 61 CaI.2d 575, 578 [39 CaI.Rptr. 531, 394 P.2d
67] ; People v. Shelton (1964) 60 Ca1.2d 740, 744 [36 Cal.
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Rptr. 433, 388 P.2d 665]), and the right to object to the
introduction of illegally obtained evidence even if the constitutional right invaded was that of a third person (People
v. Jfartin (1955) 45 Ca1.2d 755 [290 P.2d 855]) insure full
presentation of any claimed constitutional violation at the
trial level. The right to appeal (Pen. Code, §§ 1237, 1466,
subd. 2), the right to secure an adequate record on appeal (In
re Paiva (1948) 31 Ca1.2d 503, 508 [190 P.2d 604] ; People
v. Smith (1949) 34 Cal.2d449, 453 [211 P.2d 561]; In re
Henderson (1964) 61 Cal.2d 541 [39 Cal.Rptr. 373, 393 P.2d
685]), and the right to counsel on appeal (Douglas V. California (1963) 372 U.S. 353 [83 S.Ct. 814, 9 L.Ed.2d 811])
insure full opportunity to secure appellate review.
Failure to exercise these readily available remedies will
ordinarily constitute such a deliberate bypassiilg of orderly
state procedures as to justify denial of federal as well as state
collateral relief. (Fay V. Noia (1963) 372 U.S. 391, 438-439
[83 8.Ct. 822, 9 L.Ed.2d 837].) Pursuit of these remedies
will give a defendant a full adjudication of his claim and also
lay the groundwork for immediate federal review. Under
these circumstances, to authorize additional state collateral
remedies would result only in needless repetition and delay.
We have recognized the need to accommodate the state system
to the existence of a federal collateral remedy (In re Shipp,
supra, 62 Ca1.2d at pp. 554-555), but such accommodation
does not require the abandonment of procedures vital to the
orderly administration of justice by the state courts. Preservation of a defendant's constitutional rights lies not in mUltiple
state remedies that will ordinarily produce the same result,
but in one effective state remedy plus an awareness on the
part of all state officials that ultimate federal review is available. We expedite the availability of that federal remedy
by the compilation of a full and adequate record and by insisting that one state remedy is ordinarily enough.
Petitioners contend, however, that an exception should be
recognized when all remedies at trial and on appeal are exercised, but direc~ review terminates in the appellate department of the superior court. Direct review in· petitioners' case
terminated in that court owing to the orderly regulation of the
courts' business pursuant to rules based on the seriousness
of the crime involved. Such regulation should not be compromised by special rules to afford further review beyond the
appellate department in the absence of compelling reasons.
There are no such reasons here. Petitioners have been con-
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victed on reliable, albeit allegedly unconstitutionally obtained,
evidence. They have been afforded a full trial and appellate
review of their constitutional claims pursuant to substantially
the same standards that would apply had they been subject to
trial in the superior court rather than the municipal court.
To permit further review on habeas corpus of the legality of
the search and seizure would afford them more remedies than
are available to those charged with more serious crimes, and
such further review could be justified only on the impermissible assumption that the municipal courts and the appellate
departments of the superior courts cannot be trusted to discharge their duty to enforce the Constitution.
The writ of habeas corpus is discharged and petitioners are
remanded to the custody of the Los Angeles Municipal Court
for the execution of sentence.
McComb, J., Peters, J., Tobriner, J., Peek, J., Mosk, J., and
Burke, J., concurred.

[L.A. No. 28499. In Bank. Nov. 10, 1965.]
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R. G. GREYDANUS et al., Petitioners, v. INDUSTRIAL
ACCIDENT COMMISSION and DOMINIQUE BASTERRETCHE, Respondents.
[la, Ib] Workmen's Compensation-Compensable Injuries-Injuries Received While Entering Employer's Premises.-A dairy
employee who was required as a part of his joh each day to
turn left off a highway into his employer's dairy farm to get
to his work in the milking harn was exposed to a particular
risk not shared hy the public generally and thus was entitled
to workmen's compensation benefits for injuries sustained
when, in making such turn, his vehicle was struck by a truck
attempting to pass him on the left and, at the time of the
impact, he had completed his turn and his vehicle was headed
directly toward the harn.
[2] Id.-Compensable Injuries-Going to and Coming From Work.
-Generally, employees are not covered by workmen's compen[2] See Ca1.Jur.2d, Workmen's Compensation, § 83; Am.Jur.,
Workmen's Compensation (1st ed § 217).
Mclt. Dig. References: [1] Workmen's Compensation, § 102;
[2) Workmen's Compensation, § 98; [3] Workmen's Compensation,
§ 9.

